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OPINION  
___________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Nathaniel Benjamin raises four issues on appeal from 
the District Court‘s judgment of conviction and sentence.  
First, Benjamin argues that there was insufficient evidence 
supporting one of his felon-in-possession convictions and his 
conviction for possession with intent to distribute marijuana 
and cocaine base.  Second, Benjamin contends that if the 
evidence was sufficient to convict him of gun possession in 
the house, then his conviction on that count should have 
merged with his conviction on another felon-in-possession 
charge involving the same gun at a gun range.  Third, 
Benjamin argues the District Court abused its discretion by 
allowing repeated references at trial to Benjamin‘s parole 
status.  Fourth, Benjamin contends that the felon-in-
possession statute is facially unconstitutional or, in the 
alternative, unconstitutional as applied to him.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court in part and remand in part. 
 
I. 
 
 At the time of his arrest, Benjamin was on parole and 
living with his fiancée, Stacy Esprit, her four children, and 
her infant grandchild in Norristown, Pennsylvania.  Benjamin 
supplemented his income by buying and refurbishing cars.  
Although his own driver‘s license was suspended, he obtained 
a license under the name ―James Burch,‖ using his own 
photograph.  Benjamin‘s parole officer, who knew that 
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Benjamin‘s driver‘s license had been suspended, observed 
Benjamin driving, and he organized a search of Esprit‘s home 
where Benjamin was residing. 
 
 In the search of the master bedroom, agents found a 
bag underneath the foot of the bed containing hearing and eye 
protection, targets from a shooting range, receipts for 
ammunition, a postcard with Benjamin‘s name and address on 
it, and a handgun trigger lock.  Agents found a box of 9 
millimeter ammunition next to maxi-pads and a gold purse in 
the master bedroom closet.  On the right side of the bed, 
agents found an envelope containing car titles in the name of 
James Burch, as well as the James Burch driver‘s license, an 
identification card for Nathanial Benjamin, Benjamin‘s social 
security card, and receipts for payment on an auto loan for 
James Burch.  Agents also found a notebook that, according 
to the Government‘s narcotics trafficking expert, contained 
car information, cell phone information, and illegal drug 
information.  The District Court sustained some objections to 
the expert‘s testimony as speculative, but allowed him to 
testify that he understood the ledger to contain information 
about illegal drugs as well as other items.  Agents also found 
a digital cooking scale just to the right of the bed, which 
Esprit testified she did not recognize.   
 
 In the basement, Esprit directed agents to a loaded 9 
millimeter Kel-Tec handgun in a black bag underneath a 
flowered blanket.  The bag also contained Esprit‘s permit to 
carry a concealed handgun and a box of empty ammunition.  
At trial, Esprit testified that she had the gun on her person and 
was folding laundry in the basement when the agents knocked 
at the door.  When she came upstairs, Benjamin told her that 
his parole officer was at the door, at which point she went 
back to the basement and put the gun on the table with clothes 
on top of it.  Esprit also testified that she knew Benjamin was 
not allowed to be in the vicinity of a gun, and explained that 
she always carried the gun with her and had loaded it with 
ammunition that day because she was planning on going to 
the shooting range.   
 
 At trial, Esprit explained that she had gone with 
Benjamin to purchase the handgun for herself because she 
wanted to be able to protect herself from an abusive ex-
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spouse who was soon to be released from prison, and that 
Benjamin suggested a different model than the gun she 
purchased.  According to Esprit, the day after the gun 
purchase, Benjamin accompanied her to the gun range where 
he used the name James Burch to fill out paperwork.  Esprit‘s 
testimony that Benjamin fired two clips at the range forms the 
basis for Benjamin‘s first conviction of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm.    
 
Also in the basement, agents discovered a pit bull in a 
cage and, stacked by the back door, the stereo and car 
equipment Benjamin used to fix cars.  In ceiling joists near 
the back door, agents found bags containing 6.62 grams of 
cocaine base and 326.93 grams of marijuana.  Esprit denied 
any knowledge of the drugs in the basement.  She testified 
that none of her children had ever had any problems with 
drugs and that she had a zero tolerance policy for drugs.  She 
also stated that her granddaughter‘s father, her two godsons, 
and their friend used to visit the house and would congregate 
in the basement to play pool and air hockey.       
 
When they searched the kitchen, agents found an open 
box of nitrile gloves, which Esprit testified she used for 
cleaning.  In Benjamin‘s cars, agents also found latex and 
nitrile gloves.  The Government‘s narcotics expert testified 
that individuals on parole used those types of gloves when 
packaging narcotics so that they would not be caught with 
drugs present in their system in a random drug test.  He also 
testified that the facts and circumstances of the case were 
consistent with distribution rather than personal use.  He 
based his opinion on how the drugs were packaged, the 
amount of drugs, the presence of the scale, and the lack of 
any crack pipe in the house.  The drug expert further stated 
that he believed Benjamin to be the drug dealer based on the 
nitrile gloves in Benjamin‘s car, Benjamin‘s familiarity with 
guns, the presence of the pit bull, Benjamin‘s use of the alias 
―James Burch,‖ Benjamin‘s use of multiple vehicles 
registered to the alias, and the presence of the notebook that 
the expert believed to be a drug ledger.   
 
 Benjamin was charged with one count of possession 
with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, 
in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B); one count of 
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possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); and two counts of 
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
1
  The case was tried to a jury, with the 
felon-in-possession charges bifurcated from the first set of 
charges.  Benjamin was convicted on all counts on March 9, 
2011.     
 
 Benjamin filed a post-trial motion challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence and certain evidentiary rulings, 
which the District Court denied on July 5, 2011.  On July 13, 
2011, the District Court sentenced Benjamin to twenty years 
of imprisonment, consisting of twenty years on the cocaine 
base count and ten years each on the other counts, running 
concurrently.  The District Court further sentenced Benjamin 
to eight years of supervised release, consisting of eight years 
on the cocaine base count, four years on the marijuana count, 
and three years on each felon-in-possession count, all to run 
concurrently, as well as a fine of $2,000 and a special 
assessment of $400.  Benjamin timely appealed.   
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231 and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  Benjamin raises four issues on appeal.  We 
will address each in turn.   
 
A. 
 
Benjamin does not challenge his conviction for being a 
felon in possession of a firearm at the gun range, but argues 
that the Government‘s evidence on the second felon-in-
possession charge, for possession inside the house, was 
                                                                
1
 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) provides, in pertinent part:  ―It shall 
be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any 
court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or 
foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any 
firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 
ammunition which has been shipped or transported in 
interstate or foreign commerce.‖ 
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insufficient.  Benjamin further contends that the evidence 
offered to support his convictions on the counts of possession 
with intent to distribute drugs was insufficient.   
 
 ―In reviewing a jury verdict for sufficiency of the 
evidence, we ‗must consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government and affirm the judgment if there 
is substantial evidence from which any rational trier of fact 
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.‘‖  United States 
v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting United 
States v. Frorup, 963 F.2d 41, 42 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
 
 The convictions on both the felon-in-possession charge 
for the gun in the house and the drug charges rested on a 
theory of constructive possession.  Constructive possession 
occurs when ―‗[a] person who, although not in actual 
possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention at 
a given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing, 
either directly or through another person or persons.‘‖  United 
States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99, 112 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
United States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 883 (3d Cir. 
1991)).  ―Dominion and control are not established, however, 
by ‗mere proximity to the [item], or mere presence on the 
property where it is located or mere association with the 
person who does control the [item].‘‖  United States v. 
Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814, 818 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Brown, 3 
F.3d at 680).  ―Such dominion and control need not be 
exclusive but may be shared with others.‖  United States v. 
Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1035 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 
 In Brown, defendant Baltimore had a key to a ―cut 
house‖ where large quantities of illegal drugs were found.  
Brown, 3 F.3d at 680-81.  Although she referred to the 
building as ―my own house,‖ and her shorts and switchblade 
were found on the premises, id. at 680, we noted that none of 
her possessions were found in a room where drugs were 
found, that her fingerprints were not found on any drugs or 
drug paraphernalia, and that there was no other evidence that 
she exerted any control over the drugs or drug paraphernalia.  
Accordingly, we held that the evidence of Baltimore‘s 
proximity was insufficient to establish constructive 
possession.  Id. at 683.  Benjamin cites this case to argue that 
his proximity was no greater than Baltimore‘s, and that 
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therefore the evidence of constructive possession was 
similarly insufficient.   
 
Proximity, however, is not the only factor that courts 
consider in determining whether a defendant had constructive 
possession.  Indeed, in Jenkins this Court warned that 
―proximity alone is not enough, no matter how near that 
proximity is,‖ and specified that ―[i]t is a serious misreading 
of [Brown] to conclude that the degree of proximity of 
Baltimore or her clothing to the drugs was a controlling 
factor.‖  Jenkins, 90 F.3d at 819-20.  In that case, the 
defendant had been found in his boxer shorts at 1:30 a.m. on a 
couch with large quantities of drugs on a coffee table before 
him and a sawed-off shotgun on the floor, but the Court held 
that something more was required to show constructive 
possession.  Id. at 821.   
 
We now consider whether there was ―more‖ evidence 
sufficient to show that Benjamin had the dominion and 
control necessary to establish constructive possession over the 
gun and drugs.  In support of the felon-in-possession count, 
the Government contends that the jury was free to reject 
Esprit‘s testimony that the gun was for her sole use and that 
she kept it on her person at all times.  Benjamin‘s control over 
the gun was demonstrated by the fact that it was found in the 
basement, along with the stereo and car equipment he used to 
repair cars outside the basement door.  The gun box was 
found under the bed he shared with Esprit and the 
ammunition was stored in the closet of the room they shared.  
On the same side of the bed, agents discovered an envelope 
with documents tied to Benjamin.  Furthermore, unlike in 
Brown and Jenkins where the defendants were merely shown 
to have been near drugs, there is direct evidence that 
Benjamin had used the gun in the past. 
 
The Government further contends that Benjamin‘s 
dominion and control over the gun were demonstrated by 
Esprit‘s testimony that when Benjamin told her that his parole 
officer was at the door, she immediately hid the gun in the 
basement.  The Government also argues that evidence that 
Benjamin was involved in the drug trade strengthened the 
conclusion that he had dominion and control over the gun.  
Based on this evidence, the District Court correctly held that, 
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viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, there 
was sufficient evidence to support the second gun possession 
charge.   
 
 In support of the drug convictions, the District Court 
noted that the drugs were found in a secreted location in the 
same area of the basement as Benjamin‘s stereo equipment 
and near the door he used to access the cars he was repairing.  
A scale, of which Esprit denied any knowledge, was found in 
the bedroom Benjamin and Esprit shared.  Nitrile gloves were 
found in the kitchen and in a car registered to Benjamin‘s 
alias ―James Burch.‖  The jury was entitled to credit the 
Government expert‘s testimony that the notebook found 
beside Benjamin‘s bed in an envelope with paperwork 
bearing his name was, in part, a drug ledger.  Although 
Benjamin argues that evidence showed that teenagers used 
the basement for recreation, suggesting that the drugs may 
have belonged to them, we are required to view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Government.  The District 
Court correctly held that there was sufficient evidence on the 
drug charges, and thus, we will affirm.   
 
B. 
 
Benjamin argues that if this Court determines that 
there was sufficient evidence to uphold his conviction for 
possession of the gun in the house, then that charge should 
merge with his conviction for possession of the gun at the gun 
range, which he does not otherwise challenge on appeal, 
because the two charges are duplicative and violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.  Benjamin did not raise this issue in 
the District Court, so we review for plain error.  United States 
v. Miller, 527 F.3d 54, 70 (3d Cir. 2008).  We must determine 
whether entry of the two separate felon-in-possession 
convictions ―constitutes ‗(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) 
that affect[s] substantial rights.  If all three conditions are 
met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to 
notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously 
affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.‘‖  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United 
States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 99 (3d Cir. 2001)).   
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1. 
 
We begin by considering whether the District Court‘s 
entry of separate convictions and sentences for possession of 
a firearm by Benjamin in violation of § 922(g)(1) constituted 
―error.‖  To answer that question, we must first consider 
whether the § 922(g)(1) felon-in-possession crime is a 
continuing offense.  This is an issue of first impression in this 
Court, though our sister Courts of Appeals that have 
considered this issue have uniformly held that it is a 
continuing offense.  See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 622 F.3d 
784, 793-96 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rivera, 77 F.3d 
1348, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Horodner, 
993 F.2d 191, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jones, 
533 F.2d 1387, 1390-92 (6th Cir. 1976). 
 
 Possession is generally understood as a course of 
conduct.  Rivera, 77 F.3d at 1351; Horodner, 993 F.2d at 193; 
Jones, 553 F.2d at 1391.  Accordingly, ―by prohibiting 
possession Congress intended to punish as one offense all of 
the acts of dominion which demonstrate a continuing 
possessory interest in a firearm.‖  Jones, 553 F.2d at 1391.  
We thus join our sister Courts of Appeals in holding that the 
felon-in-possession crime in § 922(g)(1) is a continuing 
offense.     
 
 We now turn to the issue of whether Benjamin‘s two 
convictions for the possession of a single gun should merge 
into one.  Because the felon-in-possession crime is 
continuing, charging and punishing a defendant twice for the 
same firearm requires an interruption in continuity of 
possession.  Rivera, 77 F.3d at 1351 (―Where there is no 
proof that possession of the same weapon is interrupted, the 
Government may not arbitrarily carve a possession into 
separate offenses.‖); Horodner, 993 F.2d at 193 
(acknowledging ―that a new possession, separately 
chargeable, could begin if possession was interrupted‖); 
Jones, 533 F.2d at 1391 (holding defendant Jones could only 
be convicted of one count under § 922(g)(1) when there 
existed ―no proof that there was any interruption in the 
possession by Jones of the weapon‖).  More specifically, 
continuity must be interrupted by ―relinquishment of both 
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actual and constructive possession of the gun before it is 
reacquired.‖  Ellis, 622 F.3d at 794.   
 
The Government argues here that Benjamin‘s second 
gun possession conviction was based on constructive 
possession, which was interrupted when Benjamin was away 
from home because, while he was away from home, he would 
have lacked the ability to control the firearm that Esprit kept 
with her.  As set forth earlier, physical proximity is not 
necessary to establish constructive possession.  See Ellis, 622 
F.3d at 795 (concluding that evidence that the defendant was 
able to ―reacquire actual physical possession‖ of a gun from a 
fellow gang member suggested that the defendant had 
maintained constructive possession); Horodner, 993 F.2d at 
193-94 (holding that even though the defendant left a gun at a 
repair shop, constructive possession remained because the 
defendant ―retained the right to possess and control it‖); cf. 
Garth, 188 F.3d at 113 (noting that access is not sufficient to 
show constructive possession).  Additionally, under the 
theory of joint possession, ―‗dominion and control need not 
be exclusive but may be shared with others.‘‖  United States 
v. Introcaso, 506 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Davis, 461 F.2d at 1035).  The fact that Esprit had actual 
possession of the gun and may not have always been with 
Benjamin, then, does not preclude Benjamin‘s constructive 
possession of the same weapon.   
 
The evidence supporting constructive possession — as 
explained more fully above — came not only from the 
presence of the gun in the couple‘s shared home, but also 
from Benjamin‘s participation in the gun purchase and 
Esprit‘s attempt to hide the gun when Benjamin warned her 
that his parole officer had arrived.  See Davis, 461 F.2d at 
1034-36 (holding that a jury could reasonably infer 
possession in part from evidence that occupants of house 
containing drugs had unsuccessfully attempted to destroy the 
drugs before police entered).  The jury did not hear evidence 
that Benjamin‘s possession of the gun was ever interrupted, 
and the Government may not simply rely on the fact that 
Esprit and Benjamin were not always at home together to 
show an interruption in possession that would permit a second 
conviction.  Without evidence that Benjamin relinquished 
constructive possession of the gun, there could be only one 
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possession conviction.  As a result, we hold that the District 
Court committed error when it convicted and punished 
Benjamin for two separate counts of possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon.    
 
2. 
 
 The Court must now determine whether the District 
Court‘s error was ―plain.‖  In United States v. Tann, 577 F.3d 
533 (3d Cir. 2009), this Court addressed the similar question 
of whether the district court committed plain error when it 
convicted the defendant of simultaneous possession of a 
firearm and ammunition at the same location, and concluded 
that it had.  Id. at 537-43.  Although the continuing nature of 
the conduct criminalized by the felon-in-possession statute is 
a matter of first impression for this Court, we hold that the 
District Court‘s error was plain.  See id. at 537-38 (reasoning 
that although its holding regarding the ―allowable unit of 
prosecution under § 922(g) is a matter of first impression,‖ 
the district court‘s error was plain).  In so holding, we 
reiterate that the Courts of Appeals that have addressed the 
question have uniformly held that § 922(g)(1) is a continuing 
offense.  Further, the Government does not contest this legal 
conclusion. 
 
3. 
 
 We next consider whether the error affected 
Benjamin‘s substantial rights.  The Government argues that 
because Benjamin was sentenced to concurrent terms for the 
two felon-in-possession convictions, the only additional 
punishment stemming from the second conviction is a one 
hundred dollar special assessment, which does not affect 
Benjamin‘s substantial rights.  However, as this Court 
recognized in Tann, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
even when a second conviction does not add time to a 
defendant‘s sentence, ―‗the potential adverse collateral 
consequences‘‖ of an unauthorized conviction ―‗may not be 
ignored‘‖ when determining whether a defendant‘s 
substantial rights have been affected.  Id. at 538 (quoting Ball 
v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 865 (1985)).  While the 
second conviction may not have had the ―immediate practical 
effect‖ of increasing the length of his sentence, Benjamin 
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does risk additional adverse consequences due to the second 
conviction, such as delayed parole, increased social stigma, or 
even a higher sentence under a recidivist statute if he were 
convicted of any future crimes.  See Tann, 577 F.3d at 540.  
We therefore follow Tann, and hold that Benjamin‘s 
substantial rights were affected by the second conviction. 
 
4. 
 
 Having determined that the error below was plain and 
affected Benjamin‘s substantial rights, we now examine 
whether the District Court‘s error ―seriously affect[ed] the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings‖ such that this Court should exercise its 
discretion to correct the error.  United States v. Olano, 507 
U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (quotation marks and citations omitted).  
The arguably limited nature of the additional assessment does 
not erase the fact that Benjamin was saddled with an 
unauthorized conviction with the potential to cause him 
serious adverse consequences.  ―[A]ny additional 
unauthorized conviction and its accompanying special 
assessment . . . seriously calls into question the fairness and 
integrity of judicial proceedings.‖  United States v. Lewis, 
660 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2011).  We hold that leaving the 
error uncorrected would seriously and detrimentally affect the 
fairness, integrity and public reputation of these proceedings 
and, therefore, it is appropriate for this Court to use its 
discretion to grant relief.      
 
C. 
 
Benjamin argues that the District Court erred in 
allowing repeated references to his parole status in violation 
of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1), which prohibits the 
use of ―[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act . . . to prove 
a person‘s character in order to show that on a particular 
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.‖  
We review the District Court‘s decision to admit evidence for 
abuse of discretion.  United States v. Cruz, 326 F.3d 392, 394 
(3d Cir. 2003).  
 
 We have held that Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion 
rather than exclusion.  United States v. Kellogg, 510 F.3d 
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188, 197 (3d Cir. 2007).  ―To be admissible under Rule 
404(b), evidence of uncharged crimes or wrongs must (1) 
have a proper evidentiary purpose; (2) be relevant; (3) satisfy 
Rule 403; and (4) be accompanied by a limiting instruction 
(where requested) about the purpose for which the jury may 
consider it.‖  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 249 (3d 
Cir. 2010).
2
   
 
We hold that Benjamin‘s parole status was admitted 
for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) as ―helpful 
background.‖  See id. at 247 (―[A]llowing the jury to 
understand the circumstances surrounding the charged crime 
— completing the story — is a proper, non-propensity 
purpose under Rule 404(b).‖).  As the District Court noted, 
the trial could not have been conducted without the jury 
hearing that Benjamin was on parole.  The Government 
correctly argues that the evidence of Benjamin‘s parole status 
was relevant to the jury‘s understanding of why the search 
took place.  The Government further correctly argues that the 
evidence was relevant to explain Benjamin‘s motive for using 
an alias, for using gloves to hide his drug trafficking activity, 
and to explain Esprit‘s testimony that she hid the gun because 
she knew Benjamin was not allowed to be around firearms as 
a condition of his parole.  See Cruz, 326 F.3d at 395 (―Here 
the government articulated the logical inferences that render 
Cruz‘s parole status relevant to establishing Cruz‘s motive, 
intent and method of concealing his illegal drug activity in 
order to avoid the risk of parole revocation.  A defendant‘s 
parole status has been held to be probative of why a defendant 
would take extra steps to hide his criminal activity.‖).  The 
probative value of this evidence is not substantially 
outweighed by whatever limited prejudice may have been 
caused by the references to Benjamin‘s parole status, which 
                                                                
2
 Benjamin did not request such a limiting instruction and 
does not suggest that the District Court should have given 
such an instruction sua sponte.  See generally Ansell v. Green 
Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515, 526 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(holding that the defendant had waived any challenge to the 
district court‘s failure to give a limiting instruction addressing 
Rule 404(b) evidence by failing to request one at trial or raise 
the issue on appeal).     
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the District Court was careful to minimize by, for instance, 
preventing the Government from presenting evidence of 
Benjamin‘s underlying drug trafficking convictions. 
 
 We hold that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting evidence that Benjamin was on parole, 
and we will affirm on this ground.   
 
D. 
 
Benjamin argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is 
unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him under the 
Commerce Clause in order to preserve the issue for Supreme 
Court review.  He correctly recognizes that his constitutional 
arguments are foreclosed by our precedent in United States v. 
Singletary, 268 F.3d 196 (3d Cir. 2001).  Therefore, we need 
not discuss his constitutional challenges any further.   
 
III. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we will remand this case to 
the District Court with instructions to vacate the sentence on 
Benjamin‘s conviction under § 922(g)(1) for possession of 
the gun in his house and to merge the two convictions under § 
922(g)(1) into one conviction.  We will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court in all other respects. 
 
